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GSV SUMMARY 
The paper reports on a follow-up study, undertaken in mid-1983, of 52 
new manufacturing firms in South Hampshire, all started since 1975, and 
which were originally interviewed in 1981 in a study of new firm formation 
(the results are presented in Discussion Paper No 13). The study therefore 
covers a two year period, 1981-1983, in which the economy was in a deep 
depression, having "bottomed out" following the steep fall in the level of 
economic activity in late 1979/1980. However, such adverse economic 
circumstances do not appear to have had as detrimental an impact on the 
panel of firms as might have been anticipated. Admittedly, 23% of the 
original group of firms had closed in the period between the two surveys, 
but some were already clearly in difficulty as a result of internal problems 
when first interviewed. Moreover, less than half of the surviving firms 
claimed to have been adversely affected by the recession. Indeed, as a 
group the panel of surviving firms is characterised by increases in 
turnover, floorspace and employment and improvements in the quality of 
premises, capital stock and technological sophistication - all supporting 
the notion of a company 'life cycle' model. However, changes in other 
dimensions of business development - notably management structure, markets 
and customers - tended to be quite limited. The panel is also characterised 
by increased variability in employment, with the upper quartile value increasing 
by a greater rate than the median on most indicators - a result of the 
rapid growth of the small number of 'high fliers' which have pulled further away 
from the majority of firms in the group. Moreover, it is this small group of 
'highfliers' in the panel which has made the greatest contribution to 
employment generation and economic development. It is concluded that policy 
would achieve more substantive results by shifting from its present 
indiscriminate assistance to the small firm sector towards a more selective 
approach which attempts to encourage the creation of greater numbers of 
rapid growth firms. 1. INTRODUCTION 
The recessionary conditions of the early 1980s have provided an extremely 
harsh economic environment for industry. Small businesses, generally 
lacking the financial resources and diversified products and markets of 
the corporate sector to provide at least a temporary cushion against a 
downturn, have been particularly hard hit. Since most small manufacturing 
enterprises serve other manufacturing firms, generally by supplying 
components and equipment or else by undertaking industrial services on a 
sub-contract basis, the massive drop in industrial output since mid-1979 
(Figure 1) - a result of plant closures, destocking and cutbacks in capital 
investment by the manufacturing sector - has led to a considerable contraction 
in the demand for many of the products and services which they offer. Public 
sector spending on capital projects and equipment has also contracted, 
thereby reducing the amount of work for those small firms which act as 
sub-contractors and suppliers to the larger 'prime contractors', while the 
rapid rise in unemployment has meant that fewer consumers have had the 
income to purchase the products and services provided directly or indirectly 
by small firms. Paradoxically, the volume of retail sales reached record 
levels during 1983 (up from a value of 104 in 1980 to 114 in mid-1983 at 
1978 prices, 1978 = 100), reflecting not so much an increase in real personal 
disposable income (which fell from 100 in 1980 to 97,3 by the third quarter 
of 1983) but a decline in the proportion of personal disposable income which 
is saved (Financial Times, 29.9.83). However, much of this 'consumer boom' 
has involved the purchase of imported goods; imports of finished 
manufactures and consumer goods have risen substantially during the recession. 
This decline in industrial and - to a lesser extent - non-industrial demand 
since 1979 has predictably led to a sharp rise in the number of business 
failures (Figure 2) especially amongst small firms, leading to fears amongst 
some large companies of supply and bottleneck problems in any economic 
upturn (Elliot, 1982). However, the closure of large numbers of small firms 
has not necessarily enhanced the business prospects of surviving companies 
because it has been accompanied by a rapid increase in the formation of new 
businesses (Figure 3) as rising unemployment has 'pushed' many people into 
entrepreneurship (Harrison and Hart, 1983; Binks and Jennings, 1983), while 
start-up costs have been minimized by the availability of secondhand 
machinery from liquidators auctions. It has been suggested (Binks, 1983; 
Binks et al. 1983) that by obtaining cheap machinery and through working 
long hours with very little personal financial return, new firms have been able to compete with established firms in the same industry who will, in 
all probability, be paying realistic wages and have incurred higher 
capital costs, threatening their survival in some cases. In addition, the 
ability of established small firms to re-invest in new machinery may be 
threatened by the distortions in the secondhand machinery market caused by 
the large numbers of companies in liquidation. The effect of this will be 
to reduce the return which established companies can obtain through the 
disposal of their secondhand machinery, thereby increasing the amount of 
finance required to purchase modern equipment, perhaps to an impossibly high 
level. Overall, the short run effect of large numbers of company liquidations 
may therefore be to pull established firms towards, and in some cases across, 
the margin between survival and failure. 
Various industrial organizations (e.g. CBI, Association of Independent 
Businesses, Chambers of Commerce) have attempted to monitor the effects of the 
recession on small businesses through their regular surveys of members. 
However, such appraisals are, of necessity, highly generalized, limited in 
detail and unrepresentative in coverage. This study is one of the few which 
attempts, albeit in limited terms, to assess at a local scale the effect of the 
recession on small firms (also see Lloyd and Dicken, 1982, pp 41-43, 106-112; 
Leigh et al, 1983). It examines a panel of 52 new manufacturing firms in 
South Hampshire which were originally interviewed during the first half of 
of 1981 in a study of new firm formation (Mason, 1982; also see Mason and 
Lloyd, 1983). The follow-up study, which was undertaken between mid-May and 
early August 1983, examined the developments in each firm since the original 
interview. The study therefore covers the fortunes of the firms during a 
period of just over two years in which the econorny was in a deep depression; 
as Figure 1 shows the recession had 'bottomed out' by early 1981 but there 
were few signs of sustained recovery by mid-1983 despite some short-lived 
upturns in certain economic indicators. 
The firms themselves - described in Mason (1982) - were all post-1975 
start-ups. The oldest firm was therefore only in its eighth year of 
operation when interviewed in the follow-up study while the median age was 
five years. Although the panel of firms had, with only a few exceptions, 
passed what is statistically the most hazardous age for a new business -
the first three years (Ganguly, 1983) - the original survey nevertheless 
hinted that many were vulnerable to a prolonged economic downturn. For 
example, the majority were already experiencing cash flow problems, generally 
regarded as the most common immediate cause of company failure (Dickson, 1983), and for some of these businesses any further deterioration in the state 
of their working capital could have been fatal. In addition, one-quarter 
of the firms in the panel reported either that their turnover had 
fluctuated since start-up or else that it had peaked and was now declining. 
Moreover, most firms were serving the local/regional manufacturing sector, 
primarily by undertaking sub-contract work, and therefore were sensitive to 
any decline in demand from this source. However, in this context it was 
to the advantage of South Hampshire's new manufacturing firm sector that -
according to both the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the 
CBI Southern Branch - economic recovery was considerably stronger in the 
south of England than in the rest of the country (London Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, 1982; Financial Times, 3,10.83). Nevertheless, over one-quarter 
of the panel relied on a narrow range of key customers and were therefore 
vulnerable to changes in the economic fortunes of these firms. 
A significant proportion of the firms surveyed in 1981 therefore appeared 
to be at risk on one or more counts in the event of a prolonged recession. 
In contrast, only a small minority of firms in the panel seemed relatively 
favourably positioned to ride out the recession by possessing one or more 
of the following characteristics: their own proprietary product (which in 
some cases had innovative properties); substantial export business; 
significant sales to the service sector; and operating in a market niche 
with few competitors. 
In order to intrude as little as possible on the good will of the 
companies (and thereby keeping open the option of future follow-up studies) 
the interviews were restricted to a relatively narrow range of topics. 
These comprised shareholding structure and legal status, finance and 
investment, products and markets, locational change and employment. The 
response rate was very satisfactory, with only three of the firms which 
survived as independent companies unable to be interviewed again (a response 
rate of 92%), in each case as a result of the pressures of work on the 
owner-managers. However, information was obtained from these firms on 
their current employment levels and turnover. 
2, SURVIVAL AND CLOSURE RATES 
Of the 52 post-1975 start-ups interviewed in the original study, 37, 
(71%) survived as independent companies over the period 1981 to 1983. 
The fortunes of these firms are discussed in Section 4. The remaining 
firms fall into three categories (Table 1). The first comprises one firm 
which was taken over by an established private company, apparently as a that had ceased to trade. In addition, it was considered that any 
conclusions reached after interviews with founders about the reasons for 
the failure of their companies would be invalidated by the small numbers 
involved. Moreover, there would be inevitable difficulties in tracing 
the founders who - even if contacted - might be unwilling to discuss the 
failure of their enterprise because it would reflect badly on them. (In 
the event, this fear was not borne out in the one interview which was 
conducted with a failed founder.) A pilot study to examine the feasibility 
of identifying, contacting and interviewing the founders of failed 
enterprises would, however, represent a worthwhile methodological exercise. 
Information obtained from the interviews in the original survey indicated 
that three of the twelve firms which subsequently failed were already close 
to closure in 1981 and three others were facing quite serious demand or 
production problems. However, none of the other six firms which subsequently 
closed displayed any obvious signs of future failure or indicated that they 
were encountering serious difficulties of any kind, but this might simply 
serve to underline that problems which lead to failure in small firms 
frequently appear with great rapidity, although it is equally the case that 
many small firm owner-managers fail to notice or react to early danger 
signals (Dickson, 1983). Nevertheless, half of the firms which subsequently 
closed reported a declining or fluctuating trend in turnover at the original 
interview (representing nearly half of all the firms in the original panel 
which fell into this category) whereas only four of the subsequent failures 
reported a steady growth in turnover since start-up. Moreover, three-quarters 
of the firms which subsequently closed reported at the original interview 
that they were experiencing liquidity problems, representing about 30% of 
firms in the original panel which experienced this problem. 
In most respects the characteristics of firms which subsequently closed 
displayed at most only marginal discrepancies from surviving firms. For 
example, the median date of start-up was the same for both failures and 
survivors (1978) although this does mask the tendency for more recent 
start-ups to display a slightly higher failure rate. Hence, for firms which 
started in 1979 or 1980 the failure rate was one-third compared with only 
around one-quarter for firms started in 1976 and 1978 and just 8% amongst 
1977 starts. Half of the failed firms were engaged in metals and engineering 
activities but this did not represent an excessive concentration when 
compared with the industrial distribution of the original 52 firms. However, 
it is noticeable that only one of the seven firms in the 'high tech' sectors of electronics and instrument engineering closed. Perhaps surprisingly, 
firms undertaking sub-contract work were no more vulnerable to closure 
than those with their own products, but a narrow customer base did seem 
to be associated with a greater probability of closure, with one-third 
of the firms in the original panel which depended on a small number of key 
customers subsequently closing. In terms of start-up characteristics, 
there was a slight tendency for firms started by a single founder to display 
a higher closure rate, but the previous experience of a founder in starting 
a business did not appear to influence the likelihood of subsequent failure. 
In contrast to the anticipated pattern, firms which were started on a 
financial shoe-string were not excessively vulnerable to closure. Indeed, 
there is greater evidence for the reverse relationship to hold since firms 
which had over £15,000 of launch capital displayed the highest failure rate 
(38%) and two of the three firms which used over £100,000 of start-up funds 
subsequently closed. Other financial criteria - notably turnover and plant 
and equipment valuations - confirmed that closures were not disproportionately 
concentrated amongst the smallest firms but were represented throughout the 
size distribution. Indeed, in terms of employment size larger firms were 
more likely to close, the mean and median workforces of closures (14.7 and 
12 employees) being higher than those of survivors (11.4 and 7 employees). 
In summary, on the basis of the data collected in the original survey, firms 
which subsequently failed between 1981 and 1983 appeared in most respects 
to be broadly representative of the original group of 52 firms. Certainly, 
there was a slight tendency for firms which subsequently closed to have had 
a fluctuating or declining level of turnover up to 1981 and most had cash-flow 
problems. More recent start-ups, sole founder businesses and firms with a 
limited range of customers also displayed slightly high failure rates. 
However, characteristics such as reliance on sub-contract work, large numbers 
of competitors, limited start-up capital and a low level of capital assests, 
which might have been expected to be associated with failure, were equally 
common amongst surviving enterprises. Indeed, financial and employment 
data both indicate that larger firms were just as likely as their smaller 
counterparts to subsequently fail. 
4. SURVIVING FIRMS: DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1981 AND 1983 
The primary aim of the interviews which were conducted with the owner-
managers of those firms in the original panel which survived as independent 
companies to 1983 was to identify and account for changes which had occurred in each business since the original survey some two years earlier. Within 
this general framework it was also possible - where relevant - to examine 
the role of the recession in inducing (or constraining) change and generally 
to assess its impact on the panel of firms. 
4.1 Legal Status and Ownership Changes 
Limited liability remains the dominant, but not the unanimous, form of legal 
status amongst the surviving businesses. Indeed, one-third of firms 
continued to operate as sole traders or partnerships and only two firms, on 
the advice of their accountants, opted in favour of limited liability. The 
owner-managers of the 11 unincorporated firms (seven of whom were very small, 
with turnovers of less than £65,000 in 1982/83) each indicated that they 
could not see any merit in incorporation given their particular circumstances 
and their accountants had not been able to advise them of any advantages. 
However, most reviewed the balance of advantages and disadvantages each year 
with their accountants. 
Changes in ownership and management were similarly restricted to a small 
number of firms. The break-up of founding partnerships occurred in three 
firms (to add to the seven similar cases noted in the original survey); in 
each of these firms one of the co-founders left as a result of disagreements 
with the remaining foundar(s) (one such departing founder subsequently set 
up a new firm on his own) but in only one case did the remaining founder(s) 
take on a replacement partner. In a further two firms a director (but not 
one of the founders) was removed from office following serious conflict with 
his colleagues, but again only one firm appointed a replacement. (A further 
five firms made minor changes in the composition of their boards of directors.) 
The involvement of small firm owner-managers in legally-separate business 
ventures was a more frequent development amongst the surviving enterprises, 
with six individuals developing new personal business interests outside 
their own firms. These comprised three sole founders who each set up 
legally-independent new firms in non-manufacturing trades that were unrelated 
to the manufacturing activities of their existing companies; a founder whose 
wife and daughter set up a new business; a managing director who took a 
financial stake in a newly established company in a related line of business; 
and a sole founder who joined the board of an investment trust (which already 
had a shareholding in his firm). Adding all these new outside involvements 
of owner-managers to those made by others prior to the original survey in 
1981 reveals that in 49% of surviving firms at least one of the founders had 10 
4.2 Finance and Investment 
Despite the adverse economic conditions, the majority of surviving new 
firms (78%) had succeeded in improving on their level of gross turnover 
during the past three financial years (1980/81 to 1982/83). Moreover, in 
most cases the increase in sales was well above the rate of inflation^; 
indeed, nearly 60% of firms achieved a growth in turnover of over 50% while 
11 firms (30%) managed to double their turnover. (The best performer 
increased from less than £200,000 worth of sales to £1.2m in three years.) 
The largest two firms in the panel had achieved turnovers in excess of £2m 
by 1982/83 and a further two firms had exceeded £lm of sales; the oldest of 
these firms was only seven years old and the youngest just three years. 
The increased turnover of most of the firms in the panel is reflected in 
the median turnover value which rose from £105,000 in 1980/81 to £172,000 in 
1982/83, with over two-thirds of this increase occurring between 1981/82 
and 1982/83 (Figure 4).* 
Of more significance is that this general increase in turnover over the three 
years has been accompanied by a much greater spread around the average value, 
especially in the top half of the distribution. This is reflected in the 
inter-quartile range which increased from £156,000 to £335,000 (+ 226%) over 
three years, primarily as a result of the much greater rise in the upper 
quartile value (£198,000 in 1980/81 and £417,000 in 1982/83 - an increase of 
111%)compared with the lower quartile value (from £41,000 to £62,000, + 49%). 
As a result, the upper quartile value was almost two-and-a-half times larger 
than the median in 1982/83 compared with less than twice as large in 1980/81. 
This greater dispersion in turnover values has occurred without significant 
changes in the rank order of firms in the panel according to their turnover 
in 1980/81 and 1982/83 (r = 0.89, significant at p>0.01). Indeed, only one 
of the ten surviving firms with the largest turnovers in 1980/81 did not 
maintain this position in 1982/83 and there was only one significant change 
in ranking within the top ten, with a firm moving from 10th to 3rd position. 
The much greater dispersion in turnover values which has occurred in the 
period between the two surveys is therefore due to the better performing 
firms in the panel, that is those with above average turnovers, pulling further 
*The data in Figures 4 to 7 inclusive are presented by means of 'box and 
whisker' diagrams which provide a graphic description of the broad features 
of a distribution by using the median, inter-quartile range and extreme point 
values. The 'boxes' provide an indication of the spread of the data by 
describing the inter-quartile range, the 'cross bar' depicts the median value 
and the 'whiskers' mark the extreme values. 900 000 
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away in relative terms from the majority which are clustered around and 
below the average. 
Investment in the two years between the original interview and the follow-up 
study was, in most cases, directed towards plant and equipment rather than 
for buildings, continuing the pattern established in the years immediately 
after start-up (Mason, 1982, p.22). The median value of investment in plant 
and equipment was £10,000, although the skewed distribution (the upper quartile 
was £75,000) indicates that a sizeable minority of firms did invest 
substantially larger amounts (Figure 5). For many of the firms in the panel 
this investment in plant and equipment represented a significant increase in 
their capital assets. For example, eight firms (24%) undertook expenditure 
between 1981 and 1983 which exceeded the value of the plant and equipment 
which they possessed at the time of the original interview. This group 
comprised two 'high tech' enterprises (with turnovers of £2m and just under 
£lm) which required to invest substantial amounts of capital in order to 
keep abreast of the latesttechnologies, and seven smaller firms which each 
installed up-to-date machinery (e.g. CNC machines) to enhance their 
capabilities. A further 10 firms (29%) purchased machinery whose cost was 
equivalent to between 50 and 99% of the value of their 1981 stock of plant 
and equipment. This group comprised the remaining three companies with 
turnovers in excess of £lm, each of whom was engaged in less technologically 
intensive activities (pvc windows, polythene film and smoke detectors) and 
seven smaller firms. 
For the panel as a whole, investment in plant and equipment was largely 
designed to improve the existing stock (55%) and to provide additional 
capacity or extend the firm's capabilities (32%) rather than simply for 
replacement purposes. Preference was generally for new machinery: firms 
which directed 90% or more of their expenditure towards new machinery 
comprised 64% of the total while those spending less than half of their total 
plant and equipment expenditure on new machinery comprised less than 15% of 
the panel. As only one-third of the surviving firms had a stock of plant and 
equipment in 1981 in which over 75% was purchased new, this pattern of 
investment during the two years since the original survey therefore indicates 
that there has been a general tendency for firms to modernize their capital 
stock. The preference of owner-managers in all but one case has been to buy 
rather than lease machinery, continuing a feature which was established at 
start-up. 
The median investment on premises in the two years since the original survey 14 
was just £1500 - substantially less than the equivalent figure for plant 
and equipment - while the upper quartile value was just £8000. Indeed, 
almost one-quarter of firms incurred no expenditure at all under this heading. 
Only a small proportion of firms in the panel have therefore undertaken 
substantial investment in connection with their premises, and in the majority 
of these cases this has been linked to a major adjustment in either tenure 
or location - or both. Hence, of the seven firms (21%) which invested over 
£20,000 on premises, all but one incurred the expenditure either by expanding 
their existing (freehold) premises, by opening an additional establishment 
or through relocation. In two of these cases firms moved from leasehold to 
freehold premises and a third purchased the freehold of its existing factory. 
Sources of finance were dominated by the use of retained profits (utilized 
by 76% of firms). External sources were used to a much lesser extent, the most 
significant being finance houses (35%), bank loan (28%) and bank overdraft 
(21%). Only two firms made any use of less conventional methods of raising 
finance, namely a share issue to an investment trust (which was already a 
shareholder) and ICFC. Retained profits was also the single most important 
(or only) source of finance for exactly half of the panel, while external 
sources (bank loan, bank overdraft, finance house) fulfilled this function 
in only 38% of cases. Government grants were used by four firms (12%) but 
never as the single most important source of finance. Two of these firms 
had benefitted under the original Small Engineering Firms Investment Scheme 
(two other firms had also been awarded SEFIS grants but had not yet used it 
to purchase machinery), another obtained finance under the micro-electronics 
industry support programme and one had received funding from both the 
NRDC and under a Department of Industry support scheme for innovation. In 
terms of other sources of government financial assistance, three firms had 
benefitted under the Loan Guarantee Scheme, two firms had received help 
through the Microprocessor Application Project (MAP) while four of the major 
exporters had used the Export Credit Guarantee Scheme. When compared with 
the start-up and early post-start-up stages, the use of government grants and 
other forms of financial support by firms in the panel has been much more 
prevalent, reflecting the recent increase in the number of government 
measures to assist small businesses. Nevertheless, the majority of firms 
have made no use of government financial (or non-financial) assistance 
either before or since start-up. 
Raising outside finance was a problem which affected only a very small 
minority of firms, primarily because the panel were now established and had 55 
a 'track record' but also as a result of the general improvement in the 
supply of finance for small businesses. Indeed, only four firms (12%, but 
16% of those which attempted to obtain external funding) encountered 
difficulties in raising outside finance, in two cases because of the lack 
of security, a third which was turned down under the Loan Guarantee Scheme 
and a fourth which despite being quickly accepted for the Loan Guarantee 
Scheme by the Department of Industry nevertheless encountered a long delay 
before gaining its own bank's approval. A fifth company, one of the most 
successful in the panel, was constrained in raising outside finance because 
of the way in which it was financially structured at start-up rather than 
due to any unwillingness of the financial community to lend. 
There was no general tendency amongst the surveyed firms for stock levels 
to be reduced. Indeed, only one-quarter of firms underwent a de-stocking 
exercise while 20% of businesses actually increased their stock levels. 
But less encouraging was that just under three-quarters of firms reported 
excessive increases in the cost of particular inputs, although this created 
severe financial problems in only a very few cases. Raw materials - notably 
aluminium and steel - was the most frequently mentioned item to record a 
large increase in price (41% of firms) while petrol and associated transport 
costs, imported items, wages and rents were each highlighted by approximately 
one in every eight firms as items whose costs had risen particularly fast 
during the past two years. 
Cash flow remained a serious problem for the majority of surveyed firms. 
Indeed, there was a slight deterioration in the position compared with two 
years earlier, with 56% of firms in the panel reporting that they had cash 
flow problems, a slightly higher proportion than in 1981. However, there 
have been considerable changes in the cash flow situation of a number of 
individual firms in the panel, with seven firms (21%) suffering from cash 
flow problems in 1983 but not in 1981 while four firms (12%) had overcome 
their difficulties in the two years between interviews. For a further 12 
firms (35%) cash flow problems were prevalent in both 1981 and 1983. But if 
the identity of some of the firms with cash flow problems had changed in the 
period between the surveys, the general causes remained largely the same, 
namely slow payers (42% of firms with cash flow problems) and bad debts 
(26%). Less widespread causes included the seasonality of the business 
(aggravated by the poor summer weather in 1982) and a rapid growth in orders, 
each identified by 16% of firms as the reason for their cash flow problems. 
The most common responses to the problem were to seek an extension to their 16 
overdraft (47% of firms) and, more positively, to make greater efforts to 
chase up slow and defaulting customers (21%). However, approximately 20% 
of firms with cash flow problems made no attempt to alleviate the situation 
and were prepared to accept it fatalistically. Given that slow payers and 
defaulting customers are the main cause of cash flow difficulties amongst 
the panel, it is significant that a number of the firms which have not 
suffered from this problem ascribed the reason to their careful choice of 
customers whereby they avoided those (generally large) companies which had 
a reputation as slow payers (or else only undertook small amounts of work 
for them) and carefully investigated potential new customers. 
In summary, despite the recession most firms had been able to increase 
their turnover, in many cases quite substantially, between 1981 and 1983. 
In addition, a majority of firms had undertaken substantial investments in 
new plant and equipment while a much smaller group had made major premises-
related investments, either by purchasing and in some cases improving and 
extending freehold premises or in fitting-out costs following relocation to 
modern leasehold property. Outside finance for these investments was raised 
with little or no difficulty by all but a small number of companies, although 
most of the funding camefrom internal sources. However, this relatively 
favourable financial outlook is tempered by the continued cash flow 
difficulties which plagued a majority of enterprises in the panel, caused 
in large part by the need to pay suppliers promptly - within 30 days - while 
waiting for upwards of 60 days for their customers to settle their accounts. 
In addition, some firms - especially those engaged in subcontract engineering 
and metal industries - encountered financial difficulties as a result of 
steep increases in the cost of raw materials which, because of severe 
competition, were difficult, or even impossible, to pass on in their entirety 
in the form of higher prices. But in the final analysis, perhaps the most 
noteworthy feature to emerge from this financial profile is the increasing 
variation in the performance of the surveyed firms (reflected in the highly 
skewed turnover and investment distribution), with the rapid growth of 
the small number of 'high fliers' pulling them further away from the majority 
of the panel. 
4.3 Products, Customers and Markets 
The panel continued to be dominated by the engineering and metal 
industries (orders 7 to 12) which accounted for 41% of the surveyed firms. 
Smaller concentrations of firms occurred in electronics (15%), plastics 
(12%) and boatbuilding (9%) industries. Nine firms also undertook 17 
non-manufacturing activities, the most significant being repair and 
refurbishment (3 firms) and consultancy (2 firms). Five of these firms 
(i.e. 15% of the panel) generated 50% or more of their turnover from 
non-manufacturing activities, in contrast to the situation in 1981 when 
non-manufacturing, although still significant, accounted for no more than 
half of the turnover in any of these enterprises. 
Innovation continued to be a characteristic of only a minority of firms in 
the panel. Indeed, just 10 firms (29%) were regarded by their owner-managers 
as innovative (seven with a new product and three with a new process or design). 
Moreover, the identities of the innovative firms in the panel were almost 
identical in both 1981 and 1983; hence, there was little evidence of previously 
non-innovative firms developing innovative characteristics in the two years 
between surveys. Infact, evidence from the two surveys suggests that most 
innovative new companies display such characteristics from their formation; 
in the limited number of cases where a non-innovative new company develops a 
new product or process, this transition is likely to occur within a very 
short time (a maximum of two to three years) of their formation. 
Firms which were involved in licensing also remained very much as exceptions, 
with only one firm licensing out any products (in this case it was regarded 
as an alternative to exporting and was on a very limited scale) and three 
firms which manufactured products under licence, although in only one case 
(where the licensor was a West German company) was it significant. Moreover, 
in this case the availability of the licence had been the factor which 
prompted the formation of the firm. However, another firm in the panel had 
just commenced the manufacture of a new product under licence (from a U.S. 
company) because it was felt to represent a cheaper method of gaining access 
to the technology than undertaking their own research and development. 
Slightly over half of the surveyed firms claimed that their activities had 
changed during the past two years, although in few cases did this represent 
radical departures. For the remainder, the period between the surveys had 
simply involved 'more of the same'. The changes reported were of four types, 
the most frequent being an increase in the range of products/processes on offer 
(56% of firms reporting changes) and shifts in the balance of their activities 
(22%). In addition, two firms reported a reduction in their range of products 
manufactured and two others shifted from volume work to small scale batch 
production. Half of the firms also reported qualitative changes in their 
activities, involving improvements in the level of technological sophistication 
of their products or processes, generally associated with a more 'up market'. 25 
4.5 Bnploynent 
The role of new and small fims in job creation continues to be of great 
interest to both policy-makers and academics. Of the 37 survivirg new 
firms in South Hampshire, just over two-thirds recruited additional staff 
between 1981 and 1983, leadirg to the creation of 171 new jobs, whereas 
only 11% of firms shed labour, involvirg a loss of 12 jobs. As a group, 
surviving new finns in South Hampshire therefore increased the size of their 
workforce by 159 employees (+ 40%) in the two years between surveys to employ 
a total of 559 people in mid-1 %3. This increase in aggregate enploynent is 
reflected in a rise in the median size of workforce fron 6.5 to 8.5 (Figure 7) 
However, looking behind this aggregate upward trend in employnent reveals two 
much less sanguine features. First, just two fast-growirg fims (both in 
electronics) who together took on almost 100 extra workers between 1981 and 
1983 were responsible for 56% of the gross new jobs created by expandirg firms 
in this period. Second, and even more significant,is that the 12 firms out 
of the original group of 52 which closed between 1981 and 1983 en ployed a 
total of 177 workers in 1981; the net new jobs created by the 37 survivirg 
firms in the two years since 1981 have therefore failed to offset the 
employment loss which has resulted fron firm failures. 
Problems of recruitirg additional labour - a feature which was identified 
in the original study - continued to persist through to 1983, with over half 
of the panel encountering difficulties in this area. The primary difficulty 
was the inability to find sufficient skilled staff (six firms) and technical 
workers (two firms). Problans in recruitirg semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers was much less of a problem, affecting just two firms (whose owner-
managers both identified what they regarded as the high level of unemployment 
and social security benefits as the cause); however, conplaints amongst firms 
about the attitudes and competence of shopfloor workers was quite widespread 
(eight fims). Nevertheless, the adverse impact of such recruitment problems 
were relatively limited; only four fims (12%) reported that it had caused 
them to turn away orders or constrain their growth, while for another four 
the impact was felt in terns of the expense and cost of training workers 
who turned out to be unsuitable. 
This study therefore provides further depressirg empirical evidence to 
denonstrate the very limited job creation impact of new fims. Not only is 
substantial anploynent growth confined to a very small number of fims, 
a point which Storey (1981) has also demonstrated with aggregate data sources. 27 
but in any time period the additional employment created by survivirg firas 
in a cohort of new enterprises is more than offset by the job losses in those 
businesses which fail. The only crunb of comfort is that sane firms do 
have the capacity and willingness to take on extra staff but are constrained 
frcm doing so by shortages of workers with the appropriate skills and 
attitudes. If snail businesses are to make any impression on job creation, 
then one element in ar\y policy package must involve measures to enable those 
fims who wish to increase their workforce to do so, for example by public 
assistance with their training costs and improvements in the channels of 
recruitment, such as between universities and small firms. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The follow-up study of new manufacturing firms in South Hampshire has failed 
to confirm the most pessimistic views about the effect of the recession on 
small firms. Admittedly, nearly one-quarter of the panel closed between 
mid-1981 and mid-1983; however, although there is no way of precisely gaigirg 
the role played by the external economic environment, it would seen valid to 
conclude on the basis of the information collected from these finns in the 
original study that same would have closed even without the recession because 
of internal problems such as low labour productivity and under-capitalization, 
while others which gave no sign of internal problems in 1981 may well also 
have failed for reasons unconnected with the recession. 
Similarly, the recession has not had a uniformly adverse impact on surviving 
finrns (Table 2). Indeed, the owner-flianagers of 20 companies (59%) considered 
that the recession had not affected their business detrimentally, primarily 
because they served recession-free markets (e.g. home improvements, agriculture, 
aerospace, leisure, fire detection) or, in the case of sub-contractors 
because either their customers were in recession-free industries (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals, nuclear) or else their customer-mix was sufficiently 
diversified to enable those in decline to be offset by others which were 
expanding. For those firms which had been adversely affected by the 
recession, the main impact has been to lead to a shortage of work (8 firms: 
24%), while a less widespread effect has been a lack of continuity in work 
and 'last minute' orderirg by customers (3 firms: 9%). Two owner-managers 
(6%) considered that the effect of the recession has been to create insecurity 
about future prospects, despite the fact that both were still able to find 
sufficient orders. 